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DISPATCH NO. EQW-5711

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CLASSIFICATION

WAR 27 1953

TO : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
Attention: FHB/C ☐
FROM : Chief, EE

DATE: _____

SUBJECT: GENERAL Operational/CALL
SPECIFIC: KIBITZ 15 and His Network

REF : EQFA 850, 872, DIR 44260, FRAN 2499

1. After reviewing ☐ Is survey of the KIBITZ 15 net we would like to express our appreciation for an excellent resumé of the weaknesses, security hazards, and deficiencies of this net. We also wish to express our appreciation for the contributions of the other personnel who cooperated or assisted in the preparation of this report.

2. ☐ Is survey confirmed many of our worst suspicions and pointed out some glaring security violations and manifestations of bad faith on the part of KIBITZ 15 which were hitherto unknown to Headquarters. For example, the cover firm of KIBITZ 150, the submission of names and personal data on sub-agents to local investigating agencies and graphologists by KIBITZ 15, and the personal retention of lists of agent names and the mimeographed instructions, are certainly such glaring contradictions of generally acknowledged clandestine operating procedures that even the most inexperienced cannot be excused their commission. KIBITZ 15's attempt to foist blame for the sad plight of his network onto KIBITZ 150 does not ring true, and is not accepted. He, and he alone, must assume that part of the responsibility for the net's present structure not actually attributable to his case officer; and, we are satisfied that KIBITZ 15's recent handling has been as competent as would normally be required to direct and control any but the most unmanageable persons. KIBITZ 15 has repeatedly refused to accept guidance, instruction, constructive criticism, or tactful suggestions; such an agent should not be tolerated for even as long as we have already suffered with KIBITZ 15 -- particularly not in the crucial role of a stay-behind principal Agent.

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Orig: 23 March 1953

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FORM NO. 51-29
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

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3. We do not believe KIBITZ 15 should be used for any operations. We have repeatedly pointed out that he cannot be controlled, he is insecure, he is not amenable to even a prerequisite minimum of direction, and his political affiliations are such that KUBARK connections with him represent a distinct and continuing hazard to American interests in Germany if KUBARK sponsorship of his activities should ever be subject to publicity. If the agent could not, or would not, operate within bounds for the KIBITZ operation, there is no apparent reason to believe that he would become any more manageable or secure as a principal agent in the REDCAP program. In fact, in view of the relative sensitivity of the REDCAP program, and, in particular the responsibility vested in a REDCAP principal agent, we are quite surprised that such a controversial figure (to say the least) would even have been considered for such a position.

4. The political make-up of KIBITZ 15's net is such that it could not possibly survive more than a few days after the outbreak of hostilities. Since it would involve a considerable expenditure of time and personnel to reconstitute this net for a tactical reporting net of limited stayability, and since the number of staff members who can be committed to stay-behind work generally is limited, and further, since time may be of the essence, all available assets should be directed toward developing isolated, trustworthy, and controllable stay-behind teams who are selected with a view to stayability and location within a target area. For these reasons, we are not willing to authorize the continuance of the KIBITZ 15 net in its present form, nor any attempts to overhaul this net since such an overhaul would undoubtedly severely limit the KUFIRE stay-behind effort in other directions.

5. Re paragraph 2c of EGFA 850: We approve your suggestion to use KIBITZ 150 for the spotting of agents, but feel that all recruiting should be done by staff personnel in order to limit knowledge of the actual structure and content of our stay-behind units to staff personnel. Particularly good is the suggestion that KIBITZ 150 (or any other indigenous personnel used for spotting, etc.) be amenable to emigration. As a matter of general policy, we should use no single indigenous spotter for more than a few stay-behind units, after which he should, if possible, be encouraged to emigrate. However, we should not make specific

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commitments to ^{THESE} ~~the~~ persons regarding the type or degree of assistance they can expect from us in this matter; they should merely be encouraged to attempt such emigration on their own with the vague understanding that we may be able to aid them in some unofficial way. By limiting a single spotter's use to a few units, we refer to persons actually accepted and recruited as agents since knowledge of a number of persons who were spotted but never actually recruited is not a substantial security threat.

6. Re paragraph 3 of EGFA 850: Headquarters is presently endeavoring to develop technical facilities such as those mentioned, however, we submit that the lack of stay-behind agent assets in Germany can hardly be attributed to lack of such equipment.

7. We wish to take exception to the timing of the approach to KIBITZ 15 with regard to his use in the REDCAP program. EGFA 850, dated 17 February, stated that he would be approached on 18 February. Obviously EGFA 850 could not have arrived in Headquarters in sufficient time to permit us to note that KIBITZ 15 was being considered for REDCAP use, and to permit us to recommend against approaching him on this matter. Since no cable request for permission to take this step was received, we are left to ponder whether Headquarters was purposely circumvented in this matter.

8. Regarding the cancellation of KIBITZ 15's Operational Clearance, we wish to point out that the clearance previously issued for him was issued specifically for his use in the KIBITZ Operation. Regardless of any other factors, his transfer from one project to another would automatically render the previous operational clearance void and necessitate application for a new clearance. Hence, we had no alternative but to cancel his clearance.

9. Re paragraph 5 of EGFA 850: We are willing to attempt to obtain another three month extension of the KIBITZ Project, with no additional funds, provided it is understood that this period is necessary for the dissolution of the KIBITZ 15 net, and that this dissolution will start immediately and be carried out as rapidly as possible. We would like to remind you that all requests for project approval, amendment, or extension have to be justified by us to a higher staff. Unless we justify a requested extension to the satisfaction of this staff, approval will not be forthcoming.

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10. KIBITZ 15 should be given no reason to think that we will make any effort to further his military ambitions; apparently this is exactly what he wants, in spite of his alleged friendliness with the Blank Office. Any suggestions, no matter how tentative, that we will give him a hand in this matter will render us particularly vulnerable to blackmail, and we believe KIBITZ 15 is not above such a maneuver.

11. As far as KIBITZ 15's disposal is concerned, we fully realize that this presents extraordinary problems to you, since, contrary to custom, you promised this agent, by implication, resettlement by getting him integrated into the future German army. Probably the best way to dispose of him is to refer to the offer, which he claimed he received from Blank, to make him Engineer General. Whatever the details of his disposal are, we should be willing to pay him a sizable amount of money to get rid of him, but should under no circumstances hedge the disposal problem by trying to find other employment for him or by trying to employ him further in a clandestine capacity. This would only invite a future complication at a time when we would be even less in a position to handle it.

12. How to work out the problem of discontinuing him after you so recently offered him another job, is quite honestly your own problem. You thought of that idea, and now I think it is up to you to think of a remedy. Nevertheless, we would be interested to hear of the remedy you find.

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Peter Sichel

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